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Abstract
We study the problem of estimating high dimensional models with underlying sparse structures
while preserving the privacy of each training example. We develop a differentially private high-
dimensional sparse learning framework using the idea of knowledge transfer. More specifically,
we propose to distill the knowledge from a “teacher” estimator trained on a private dataset, by
creating a new dataset from auxiliary features, and then train a differentially private “student”
estimator using this new dataset. In addition, we establish the linear convergence rate as well as
the utility guarantee for our proposed method. For sparse linear regression and sparse logistic
regression, our method achieves improved utility guarantees compared with the best known
results (Kifer et al., 2012; Wang and Gu, 2019). We further demonstrate the superiority of our
framework through both synthetic and real-world data experiments.
1 Introduction
In the Big Data era, sensitive data such as genomic data and purchase history data, are ubiquitous,
which necessitates learning algorithms that can protect the privacy of each individual data record.
A rigorous and standard notion for privacy guarantees is differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006).
By adding random noise to the model parameters (output perturbation), some intermediate steps
of the learning algorithm (gradient perturbation), or the objective function of learning algorithms
(objective perturbation), differentially private algorithms ensure that the trained models can learn
the statistical information of the population without leaking any information about the individuals.
In the last decade, a surge of differentially private learning algorithms (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni,
2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Bassily et al., 2014; Talwar et al., 2015; Zhang
et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017, 2018; Jayaraman et al., 2018) for empirical risk minimization have
been developed. However, most of these studies only consider the classical setting, where the
problem dimension is fixed. In the modern high-dimensional setting where the problem dimension
can increase with the number of observations, all these empirical risk minimization algorithms fail.
A common and effective approach to address these issues is to assume the model has a certain
structure such as sparse structure or low-rank structure. In this paper, we consider high-dimensional
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models with sparse structure. Given a dataset S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ R are
the input vector and response of the i-th example, our goal is to estimate the underlying sparse
parameter vector θ∗ ∈ Rd, which has s∗ nonzero entries, by solving the following `2-norm regularized
optimization problem with the sparsity constraint
min
θ∈Rd
L¯S(θ) := LS(θ) +
λ
2
‖θ‖22 subject to ‖θ‖0 ≤ s, (1.1)
where LS(θ) := n
−1∑n
i=1 `(θ; xi, yi) is the empirical loss on the training data, `(θ; xi, yi) is the loss
function defined on the training example (xi, yi), λ ≥ 0 is a regularization parameter, ‖θ‖0 counts
the number of nonzero entries in θ, and s controls the sparsity of θ. The reason we add an extra `2
regularizer to (1.1) is to ensure the strong convexity of the objective function without making any
assumption on the data.
In order to achieve differential privacy for sparse learning, a line of research (Kifer et al., 2012;
Thakurta and Smith, 2013; Jain and Thakurta, 2014; Talwar et al., 2015; Wang and Gu, 2019) studied
differentially private learning problems in the high-dimensional setting, where the problem dimension
can be larger than the number of observations. For example, Jain and Thakurta (2014) provided a
differentially private algorithm with the dimension independent utility guarantee. However, their
approach only considers the case when the underlying parameter lies in a simplex. For sparse linear
regression, Kifer et al. (2012); Thakurta and Smith (2013) proposed a two-stage approach to ensure
differentially privacy. In detail, they first estimate the support set of the sparse model parameter
vector using some differentially private model selection algorithm, and then estimate the parameter
vector with its support restricted to the estimated subset using the objective perturbation approach
(Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009). Nevertheless, the support selection algorithm, like exponential
mechanism, is computational inefficient or even intractable in practice. Talwar et al. (2015) proposed
a differentially private algorithm for sparse linear regression by combining the Frank-Wolfe method
(Frank and Wolfe, 1956) and the exponential mechanism. Although their utility guarantee is worse
than Kifer et al. (2012); Wang and Gu (2019), it does not depend on the restricted strong convexity
(RSC) and smoothness (RSS) conditions (Negahban et al., 2009). Recently, Wang and Gu (2019)
developed a differentially private iterative gradient hard thresholding (IGHT) (Jain et al., 2014;
Yuan et al., 2014) based framework for sparse learning problems by injecting Gaussian noise into
the intermediate gradients. However, all the aforementioned methods either have unsatisfactory
utility guarantees or are computationally inefficient. For example, the utility guarantees provided by
Kifer et al. (2012); Thakurta and Smith (2013); Wang and Gu (2019) depend on the `2-norm bound
of the input vector, which can be in the order of O(
√
d) and grows as d increases in the worse case.
While the utility guarantee of the algorithm proposed by Talwar et al. (2015) only depends on the
`∞-norm bound of the input vector, it has a worse utility guarantee, and its convergence rate is
sub-linear.
Therefore, a natural question is whether we can achieve the best of both worlds: a strong utility
guarantee and high computational efficiency. To this end, we propose to make use of the idea
of knowledge distillation (Bucilu et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2015), which is a knowledge transfer
technique originally introduced as a mean of model compression. The original motivation of using
knowledge distillation is to use a large and complex “teacher” model to train a small “student”
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed framework: (1). A “teacher” estimator is trained using the
private dataset; (2). A new private-preserving dataset is generated using the auxiliary features and
their private predictions output by the “teacher” estimator; (3). A differentially private “student”
estimator is trained using the newly generated dataset.
model, while maintaining its accuracy. For the differentially private sparse learning problem, similar
idea can be applied here: we can use a non-private “teacher” model to train a differentially private
“student” model, while preserving the sparse information of the “teacher” model. We notice that
several knowledge transfer approaches have been recently investigated in the differentially private
classification problem (Hamm et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Bassily et al., 2018; Yoon et al.,
2018). Nevertheless, the application of knowledge distillation to the generic differentially private
high-dimensional sparse learning problem is new and has never been studied before.
In this paper, we propose a knowledge transfer framework for solving the high-dimensional sparse
learning problem on a private dataset, which is illustrated in Figure 1. Our proposed algorithm is
not only very efficient but also has improved utility guarantees compared with the state-of-the-art
methods. More specifically, we first train a non-private “teacher” model using IGHT from the
private dataset. Based on this “teacher” model, we then construct a privacy-preserving dataset
using some auxiliary inputs, which are drawn from some given distributions or public datasets.
Finally, by training a “student” model using IGHT again based on the newly generated dataset, we
can obtain a differentially private sparse estimator. Table 1 summarizes the detailed comparisons of
different methods for sparse linear regression, and we summarize the contributions of our work as
follows
• Our proposed differentially private framework can be applied to any smooth loss function, which
covers a broad family of sparse learning problems. In particular, we showcase the application of
our framework to sparse linear regression and sparse logistic regression.
• We prove a better utility guarantee and establish a liner convergence rate for our proposed
method. For example, for sparse linear regression, our method achieves O
(
K2s∗2
√
log d/(n)
)
utility guarantee, where K is the `∞-norm bound of the input vectors, and  is the privacy budget.
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Table 1: Comparison of different algorithms for sparse linear regression in the setting of (, δ)-DP.
We report the utility bound achieved by the privacy-preserving mechanisms, and ignore the log(1/δ)
term. Note that n 1, xi denotes the i-th input vector, and υ is the probability that the support
selection procedure can successfully recover the true support.
Algorithm Data Assumption Utility
Convergence
Utility Assumption
Rate
Frank-Wolfe
maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤ 1 O
(
log(nd)
(n)2/3
)
Sub-linear No
(Talwar et al., 2015)
Two Stage
maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖2 ≤ K˜ O
(
K˜2s∗2 log(2/υ)
(n)2
)
NA RSC/RSS
(Kifer et al., 2012)
DP-IGHT
maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖2 ≤ K˜ O
(
K˜2s∗2 log d
(n)2
)
Linear RSC/RSS
(Wang and Gu, 2019)
DPSL-KT
maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤ K O
(
K2s∗2
√
log d
n
)
Linear No
λ > 0
DPSL-KT maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤ K O
(
K2s∗3 log d
(n)2
)
Linear RSC/RSS
λ = 0 RSC/RSS
Compared with the best known utility bound O
(
K˜2s∗2 log d/(n22)
)
(Kifer et al., 2012; Wang
and Gu, 2019) ( K˜ is the `2-norm bound of the input vectors), our utility guarantee is better
than it by a factor of O
(
K˜2
√
log d/(K2n)
)
. Considering that K˜ can be
√
d times larger than K,
the improvement factor can be as large as O
(
d
√
log d/(n)
)
. Similar improvement is achieved for
sparse logistic regression.
• With the extra sparse eigenvalue condition (Bickel et al., 2009) on the private data, our method
can achieve O
(
K2s∗3 log d/(n22)
)
utility guarantee for sparse linear regression. It is better than
the best known result (Kifer et al., 2012; Wang and Gu, 2019) O
(
K˜2s∗2 log d/(n22)
)
by a factor
of O
(
K˜2/(K2s∗)
)
, which can be as large as O
(
d/s∗
)
. Similar improvement is also achieved for
sparse logistic regression.
Notation. For a d-dimensional vector x = [x1, ..., xd]
>, we use ‖x‖2 = (
∑d
i=1 |xi|2)1/2 to denote
its `2-norm, and use ‖x‖∞ = maxi |xi| to denote its `∞-norm. We let supp(x) be the index set of
nonzero entries of x, and supp(x, s) be the index set of the top s entries of x in terms of magnitude.
We use Sn to denote the input space with n examples and R,R′ to denote the output space. Given
two sequences {an}, {bn}, if there exists a constant 0 < C < ∞ such that an ≤ Cbn, we write
an = O(bn), and we use O˜(·) to hide the logarithmic factors. We use Id ∈ Rd×d to denote the
identity matrix. Throughout the paper, we use `i(·) as the shorthand notation for `(·; xi, yi), and
θmin to denote the minimizer of problem (1.1).
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1.1 Additional Related Work
To further enhance the privacy guarantee for training data, there has emerged a fresh line of research
(Hamm et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Bassily et al., 2018; Yoon et al., 2018) that studies the
knowledge transfer techniques for the differentially private classification problem. More specifically,
these methods propose to first train an ensemble of “teacher” models based on disjoint subsets
of the private dataset, and then train a “student” model based on the private aggregation of the
ensemble. However, their approaches only work for the classification task, and cannot be directly
applied to general sparse learning problems. Moreover, their sub-sample and aggregate framework
may not be suitable for the high-dimensional sparse learning problem since each “teacher” model is
trained on a subset of the private dataset, which makes the “large d, small n” scenario even worse.
In contrast to their sub-sample and aggregate based knowledge transfer approach, we propose to
use the distillation based method (Bucilu et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2015), which is more suitable
for the high-dimensional sparse learning problem.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some background and preliminaries about optimization and differential
privacy. We first lay out the formal definitions of strongly convex and smooth functions.
Definition 2.1. A function f : Rd → R is λ-strongly convex, if for any θ1,θ2 ∈ Rd,
f(θ1)− f(θ2)− 〈∇f(θ2),θ1 − θ2〉 ≥ λ
2
‖θ1 − θ2‖22.
Definition 2.2. A function f : Rd → R is β¯-smooth, if for any θ1,θ2 ∈ Rd,
f(θ1)− f(θ2)− 〈∇f(θ2),θ1 − θ2〉 ≤ β¯
2
‖θ1 − θ2‖22.
Next we present the definition of sub-Gaussian distribution (Vershynin, 2010).
Definition 2.3. We say X ∈ Rd is a sub-Gaussian random vector with parameter α > 0, if
(E|u>X|p)1/p ≤ α√p for all p ≥ 1 and all unit vector u with ‖u‖2 = 1.
We also provide the definition of differential privacy.
Definition 2.4 ((Dwork et al., 2006)). A randomized mechanism M : Sn → R satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by one example, and any
output subset O ⊆ R, it holds that P[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ e · P[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1).
Now we introduce the Gaussian Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014) to achieve (, δ)-DP. We start
with the definition of `2-sensitivity, which is used to control the variance of the noise in Gaussian
mechanism.
Definition 2.5 ((Dwork et al., 2014)). For two adjacent datasets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by one example,
the `2-sensitivity ∆2(q) of a function q : Sn → Rd is defined as ∆2(q) = supS,S′ ‖q(S)− q(S′)‖2.
Given the `2-sensitivity, we can ensure the differential privacy using Gaussian mechanism.
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Lemma 2.6 ((Dwork et al., 2014)). Given a function q : Sn → Rd, the Gaussian Mechanism M =
q(S) + u, where u ∼ N(0, σ2Id), satisfies (, δ)-DP for some δ > 0, if σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)∆2(q)/.
The next lemma illustrates that (, δ)-DP has the post-processing property, i.e., the composition
of a data independent mapping f with an (, δ)-DP mechanism M also satisfies (, δ)-DP.
Lemma 2.7 ((Dwork et al., 2014)). Consider a randomized mechanism M : Sn → R that is
(, δ)-DP. Let f : R → R′ be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f(M) : Sn → R′ is (, δ)-DP.
3 The Proposed Algorithm
In this section, we present our differentially private sparse learning framework, which is illustrated
in Algorithm 1. Note that Algorithm 1 will call IGHT algorithm (Yuan et al., 2014; Jain et al.,
2014) in Algorithm 2. IGHT enjoys linear convergence rate and is widely used for sparse learning.
Note that for the sparsity constraint, i.e., ‖θ‖0 ≤ s, the hard thresholding operator Hs(θ) is defined
as follows: [Hs(θ)]i = θi if i ∈ supp(θ, s) and [Hs(θ)]i = 0 otherwise, for i ∈ [d]. It preserves
the largest s entries of θ in magnitude. Equipped with IGHT, our framework also has a linear
convergence rate for solving high-dimensional sparsity constrained problems.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Sparse Learning via Knowledge Transfer (DPSL-KT)
input Loss function L¯S , distribution D˜, IGHT parameters s, η1, η2, T1, T2, function f , θ0, σ
1: θ̂ = IGHT(θ0, L¯S , s, η1, T1)
2: Generate training set: Sp = {(x˜i, ypi )}mi=1, where ypi = 〈θ̂, x˜i〉+ ξi, x˜i ∼ D˜, ξi ∼ N(0, σ2)
3: Constructing the new task: L˜(θ) = 12m
∑m
i=1
(
ypi − 〈θ, x˜i〉
)2
4: θp = IGHT(θ0, L˜, s, η2, T2)
output θp
Algorithm 2 Iterative Gradient Hard Thresholding (IGHT)
input Loss function LS , parameters s, η, T , θ0
1: for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T do
2: θt = Hs
(
θt−1 − η∇LS(θt−1)
)
3: end for
output θT
There are two key ingredients in our framework: (1) an efficient problem solver, i.e., iterative
gradient hard thresholding (IGHT) algorithm (Yuan et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2014), and (2) the
knowledge transfer procedure. In detail, we first solve the optimization problem (1.1) using IGHT,
which is demonstrated in Algorithm 2, to get a non-private “teacher” estimator θ̂. The next step is
the knowledge transfer procedure: we draw some synthetic features {x˜i}mi=1 from a given distribution
D˜, and output the corresponding private-preserving responses {ypi }mi=1 using the Gaussian mechanism:
ypi = 〈θ̂, x˜i〉 + ξi, where ξi is the Gaussian noise to protect the private information contained in
6
θ̂. Finally, by solving a new sparsity constrained learning problem L˜ using the privacy-preserving
synthetic dataset Sp = {(x˜i, ypi )}mi=1, we can get a differentially private “student” estimator θp.
Our proposed knowledge transfer framework can achieve both strong privacy and utility guaran-
tees. Intuitively speaking, the newly constructed learning problem can reduce the utilization of the
privacy budget since we only require the generated responses to preserve the privacy of original
training sample, which in turn leads to a strong privacy guarantee. In addition, this new learning
problem contains the knowledge of the “teacher” estimator, which preserves the sparsity information
of the underlying parameter. As a result, the “student” estimator can also have a strong utility
guarantee.
4 Main Results
In this section, we will present the privacy and utility guarantees for Algorithm 1. We start with
two conditions, which will be used in the result for generic models. Later, when we apply our result
to specific models, these conditions will be verified explicitly.
The first condition is about the upper bound on the gradient of the function LS , which will be
used to characterize the statistical error of generic sparse models.
Condition 4.1. For a given sample size n and tolerance parameter ζ ∈ (0, 1), let ε(n, ζ) be the
smallest scalar such that with probability at least 1− ζ, we have ‖∇LS(θ∗)‖∞ ≤ ε(n, ζ).
To derive the utility guarantee, we also need the sparse eigenvalue condition (Zhang, 2010) on the
function LS , which directly implies the restricted strong convex and smooth properties (Negahban
et al., 2009; Loh and Wainwright, 2013) of the function LS .
Condition 4.2. The empirical loss LS on the training data satisfies the sparse eigenvalue condition,
if for all θ, there exist positive numbers µ and β such that
µ = inf
v
{
v>∇2LS(θ)v | ‖v‖0 ≤ s, ‖v‖2 = 1
}
, β = sup
v
{
v>∇2LS(θ)v | ‖v‖0 ≤ s, ‖v‖2 = 1
}
.
4.1 Results for Generic Models
We first present the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 1 in the setting of (, δ)-DP.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose the loss function on each training example satisfies ‖∇`i(θmin)‖∞ ≤ γ,
and D˜ is a sub-Gaussian distribution with parameter α˜ and the covariance matrix ‖Σ˜‖2 ≤ β˜, and
m ≥ C1α˜s log d for some absolute constant C1. Given a privacy budget  and a constant δ ∈ (0, 1),
the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP if σ2 = 8mβ˜sγ2 log(2.5/δ)/(n22λ2).
Remark 4.4. Theorem 4.3 suggests that in order to ensure the privacy guarantee, the only condition
on the private data is the `∞-norm bound on the gradient of the loss function on each training
example. This is in contrast to the `2-norm bound required by many previous work (Kifer et al.,
2012; Talwar et al., 2015; Wang and Gu, 2019) for sparse learning problems. We remark that
`∞-norm bound is a milder condition than `2-norm bound, and gives a better utility guarantee that
only depends on the `∞-norm of the input data vectors instead of their `2-norm.
Next, we provide the linear convergence rate and the utility guarantee of Algorithm 1.
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Theorem 4.5. Suppose that the loss function L¯S is β¯-smooth and LS satisfies Condition 4.1
with parameter ε(n, ζ). Under the same conditions of Theorem 4.3 on `i, D˜, σ2, there exist
constants {Ci}8i=1 such that if n = m ≥ C1α˜s log d, s ≥ C2κ2s∗ with κ = β¯/λ, the stepsize
η1 = C3λ/β¯
2, η2 = C4/β˜, then θ
p converges to θ∗ at a linear rate. In addition, if we choose
λ2 = C5γ
√
s∗ log d log(1/δ)/(n), for large enough T1, T2, with probability at least 1 − ζ − C6/d,
the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C7
s∗
β¯2
ε(n, ζ)2 + C8
(
1/β¯2 + α˜2/β˜
)γ√s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
n
.
Remark 4.6. The utility bound of our method consists of two terms: the first term denotes the
statistical error of generic sparse models, while the second one corresponds to the error introduced
by the Gaussian mechanism, and is the dominating term. Therefore, the utility bound is of order
O
(
γ
√
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)/(n)
)
, which depends on the true sparsity s∗ rather than the dimension of
the problem d, and therefore is desirable for sparse learning.
The following corollary shows that if LS further satisfies Condition 4.2, our method can achieve
an improved utility guarantee.
Corollary 4.7. Suppose that LS satisfies Condition 4.2 with parameters µ, β. Under the same
conditions of Theorem 4.5 on LS , `i, D˜, the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP if we set
λ = 0 and σ2 = 8mβ˜sγ2 log(2.5/δ)/(n22µ2). In addition, there exist constants {Ci}7i=1 such that if
n = m ≥ C1α˜s log d, s ≥ C2κ2s∗ with κ = β/µ, step size η1 = C3µ/β2, η2 = C4/β˜, for large enough
T1, T2, with probability at least 1− ζ − C5/d, the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C6
s∗
β2
ε(n, ζ)2 + C7α˜
2γ
2s∗2 log d log(1/δ)
β˜µ2n22
.
Remark 4.8. Corollary 4.7 shows that if the training loss on the private data satisfies the sparse
eigenvalue condition, Algorithm 1 can achieve O˜
(
γ2s∗2/(n)2
)
utility guarantee by setting λ = 0
and the variance σ2 accordingly. It improves the utility without the sparse eigenvalue condition
O˜
(
γs∗3/2/(n)
)
in Theorem 4.5 by a factor of O˜
(
n/γ
√
s∗
)
. Note that sparse eigenvalue condition
has been verified for many sparse models (Negahban et al., 2009) including sparse linear regression
and sparse logistic regression.
4.2 Results for Specific Models
In this subsection, we demonstrate the results of our framework for specific models. Note that the
privacy guarantee has been established in Theorem 4.3, and we only present the utility guarantees.
4.2.1 Sparse linear regression
We consider the following linear regression problem in the high-dimensional regime (Tibshirani,
1996): y = Xθ∗ + ξ, where y ∈ Rn is the response vector, X ∈ Rn×d denotes the design matrix,
ξ ∈ Rn is a noise vector, and θ∗ ∈ Rd with ‖θ∗‖0 ≤ s∗ is the underlying sparse coefficient vector
that we want to recover. In order to estimate the sparse vector θ∗, we consider the following sparsity
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constrained estimation problem, which has been studied in many previous work (Zhang, 2011;
Foucart and Rauhut, 2013; Yuan et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2014; Chen and Gu, 2016)
min
θ∈Rd
1
2n
‖Xθ − y‖22 +
λ
2
‖θ‖22 subject to ‖θ‖0 ≤ s. (4.1)
The utility guarantee of Algorithm 1 for solving (4.1) can be implied by Theorem 4.5. Here we
only need to verify Condition 4.2 for the sparse linear regression model. In specific, we can show
that ∇LS(θ∗) = X>ξ/n, and we can prove that (See Lemma B.3 in Appendix) ‖∇LS(θ∗)‖∞ ≤
C1ν
√
log d/n holds with probability at least 1− exp(−C2n), where C1, C2 are absolute constants.
Therefore, we have ζ = 1− exp(−C2n), ε(n, ζ) = C1ν
√
log d/n. By substituting these quantities
into Theorem 4.5, we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.9. Suppose that each row of the design matrix satisfies maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤ K, and the
noise vector ξ ∼ N(0, ν2In). Under the same conditions of Theorem 4.5 on D˜, σ2, η1, η2, s, there
exist constants {Ci}5i=1 such that if m = n ≥ C1s log d, λ2 = C2K2s∗
√
log d log(1/δ)/(n), with
probability at least 1− C3/d, the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C4ν2K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C5α˜
2K2
s∗2
√
log d log(1/δ)
β˜n
.
Remark 4.10. Corollary 4.9 suggests that O
(
s∗ log d/n+K2s∗2
√
log d log(1/δ)/(n)
)
utility guar-
antee can be achieved by our algorithm. The term O(s∗ log d/n) denotes the statistical error for
sparse vector estimation, which matches the minimax lower bound (Raskutti et al., 2011). While
the term O˜(K2s∗2/(n)) corresponds to the error introduced by the privacy-preserving mechanism,
and is the dominating term. Compared with the best-known result (Kifer et al., 2012; Wang and Gu,
2019) O˜(K˜2s∗2/(n22)), where ‖xi‖2 ≤ K˜ for all i ∈ [n], our utility guarantee does not require the
sparse eigenvalue condition and is better than their results by a factor of O˜
(
K˜2/(K2n)
)
. Since we
have K˜ ≤ √dK in the worst case, the improvement factor can be as large as O˜(d/(n)). Compared
with the utility guarantee O˜
(
1/(n)2/3
)
obtained by Talwar et al. (2015), our method improves their
result by a factor of O˜
(
(n)1/3/(Ks∗)2
)
, which demonstrates the advantage of our framework.
Next, we present the theoretical guarantees of our methods under the extra sparse eigenvalue
condition for sparse linear regression.
Corollary 4.11. Suppose that each row xi of the design matrix satisfies xi ∼ N(0,Σ), maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤
K, and the noise vector ξ ∼ N(0, ν2In). For a given , δ, under the same conditions of Corollary
4.7 on D˜, σ2, λ, η1, η2, s, there exist constants {Ci}4i=1 such that if m = n ≥ C1s log d, the output of
Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP. In addition, with probability at least 1− C2/d, we have
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C3ν2K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C4α˜
2K2
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
β˜n22
.
Remark 4.12. According to Corollary A.1, the output of Algorithm 1 will satisfy (, δ)-DP with
the utility guarantee O˜
(
K2s∗3/(n22)
)
, which improves the result in Corollary 4.9 by a factor of
O˜
(
n/s∗
)
.
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4.2.2 Sparse logistic regression
For high-dimensional logistic regression, we assume the label of each example follows an i.i.d.
Bernoulli distribution conditioned on the input vector P(y = 1|x,θ∗) = exp (θ∗>x − log (1 +
exp(θ∗>x)
))
, where x ∈ Rd is the input vector, θ∗ ∈ Rd with ‖θ∗‖0 ≤ s∗ is the sparse parameter
vector we would like to estimate. Given observations {(xi, yi)}ni=1, we consider the following
maximum likelihood estimation problem with sparsity constraints (Yuan et al., 2014; Chen and Gu,
2016)
min
θ∈Rd
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
yiθ
>xi − log
(
1 + exp(θ>xi)
)]
+
λ
2
‖θ‖22 subject to ‖θ‖0 ≤ s. (4.2)
The utility guarantee of Algorithm 1 for solving (4.2) is shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13. Under the same conditions of Corollary 4.9 on xi, D˜, σ2, η1, η2, s, there exist
constants {Ci}5i=1 such that ifm = n ≥ C1s log d, λ2 = C2K
√
s∗ log d log(1/δ)/(n), with probability
at least 1− C3/d, the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C4K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C5α˜
2K
√
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
β˜n
.
Remark 4.14. Corollary 4.13 suggests that O
(
s∗ log d/n+K
√
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)/(n)
)
utility guar-
antee can be obtained by our algorithm for sparse logistic regression. The term O˜
(
Ks∗3/2/(n))
caused by the Gaussian mechanism is the dominating term and does not depend on the sparse eigen-
value condition, and is better than the best-known result (Wang and Gu, 2019) O˜
(
K˜2s∗2/(n22)
)
by a factor of O˜
(
K˜2s∗1/2/(Kn)
)
. The improvement factor can be as large as O˜
(
dK/(n)
)
since
K˜ ≤ √dK.
If we have the extra sparse eigenvalue condition, our method can achieve an improved utility
guarantee for sparse logistic regression as follows.
Corollary 4.15. Suppose that each row xi of the design matrix satisfies xi ∼ N(0,Σ), maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤
K. For a given , δ, under the same conditions of Corollary 4.7 on D˜, σ2, λ, η1, η2, s, there exist
constants {Ci}4i=1 such that if m = n ≥ C1s log d, the output of Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP. In
addition, with probability at least 1− C2/d, we have the following utility for θp
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C3K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C4α˜
2K2s∗2
log d log(1/δ)
β˜n22
.
Remark 4.16. Corollary A.3 shows that our method can obtain an improved utility guarantee
O˜
(
K2s∗2/(n)2
)
for sparse logistic regression under the extra sparse eigenvalue assumption.
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results of our proposed algorithm on both synthetic and real
datasets. For sparse linear regression, we compare our framework with Two stage (Kifer et al., 2012),
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Frank-Wolfe (Talwar et al., 2015), and DP-IGHT (Wang and Gu, 2019) algorithms. For sparse
logistic regression, we compare our framework with DP-IGHT (Wang and Gu, 2019) algorithm. For
all of our experiments, we choose the parameters of different methods according to the requirements
of their theoretical guarantees. More specifically, on the synthetic data experiments, we assume s∗
is known for all the methods. On the real data experiments, s∗ is unknown, neither our method
or the competing methods has the knowledge of s∗. So we simply choose a sufficiently large s
as a surrogate of s∗. Given s, for the parameter λ in our method, according to Theorem 4.5, we
choose λ from a sequence of values c1
√
s log d log(1/δ)/(n), where c1 ∈ {10−6, 10−5, . . . , 101}, by
cross-validation. For competing methods, given s, we choose the iteration number of Frank-Wolfe
from a sequence of values c2s, where c2 ∈ {0.5, 0.6, . . . , 1.5}, and the regularization parameter in the
objective function of Two Stage from a sequence of values c3s/, where c3 ∈ {10−3, 10−2, . . . , 102},
by cross-validation. For DP-IGHT, we choose its stepsize from the grid {1/20, 1/21, . . . , 1/26} by
cross-validation. For the non-private baseline, we use the non-private IGHT (Yuan et al., 2014).
5.1 Numerical Simulations
In this subsection, we investigate our framework on synthetic datasets for sparse linear and logistic
regression. In both problems, we generate the design matrix X ∈ Rn×d such that each entry
is drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1), and the underlying sparse vector θ∗ has s
nonzero entries that are randomly generated. In addition, we consider the following two settings:
(i) n = 800, d = 1000, s∗ = 10; (ii) n = 4000, d = 5000, s∗ = 50. We choose D˜ to be a uniform
distribution U(−1, 1), which implies β˜ = 1/3.
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Figure 2: Numerical results for sparse linear and logistic regression. (a), (b) Reconstruction error
versus privacy budget for sparse linear regression; (c), (d) Reconstruction error versus privacy budget
for sparse linear regression.
Sparse linear regression For sparse linear regression, the observations are generated according
to the linear regression model y = X>θ∗ + ξ, where the noise vector ξ ∼ N(0, ν2I) with ν2 = 0.1.
In our experiments, we set δ = 0.01 and vary the privacy budget  from 0.8 to 5. Note that due to
the hardness of the problem itself, we choose relatively large privacy budgets compared with the
low-dimensional problem to ensure meaningful results. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the estimation
error ‖θ̂ − θ∗‖2/‖θ∗‖2 of different methods averaged over 10 trails. The results show that the
estimation error of our method is close to the non-private baseline, and is significantly better than
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Table 2: Comparison of different algorithms for various privacy budgets  with δ = 10−5 in terms of
MSE (mean ± std) and its corresponding standard deviation on E2006-TFIDF.
Method  = 0.8  = 1.5  = 2.5  = 3.5  = 4.5
IGHT 0.8541 0.8541 0.8541 0.8541 0.8541
Frank-Wolfe 4.471 (0.239) 2.004 (0.155) 1.535 (0.140) 1.206 (0.095) 1.099 (0.082)
Two stage 4.022 (0.159) 1.803 (0.141) 1.326 (0.093) 1.107 (0.103) 1.053 (0.069)
DP-IGHT 3.731 (0.207) 1.687 (0.126) 1.304 (0.035) 1.067 (0.051) 0.968 (0.062)
DPSL-KT 1.227 (0.110) 1.178 (0.056) 1.065 (0.054) 0.971 (0.031) 0.952 (0.010)
Table 3: Comparison of different algorithms for various privacy budgets  with δ = 10−5 in terms of
test error (mean ± std) and its corresponding standard deviation on RCV1 data.
Method  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
IGHT 0.0645 0.0645 0.0645 0.0645
Frank-Wolfe 0.1381 (0.0045) 0.1134 (0.0041) 0.0978 (0.0032) 0.0882 (0.0033)
Two stage 0.1272 (0.0044) 0.1061(0.0038) 0.0949 (0.0035) 0.0866 (0.0031)
DP-IGHT 0.1179 (0.0035) 0.1026 (0.0036) 0.0922 (0.0032) 0.0824 (0.0029)
DPSL-KT 0.1105 (0.0038) 0.0974 (0.0035) 0.0885 (0.0029) 0.0787(0.0031)
other private baselines. Even when we have a small privacy budget (i.e.,  = 0.8), our method can
still recover the underlying sparse vector with reasonably small estimation error, while others fail.
Sparse logistic regression For sparse logistic regression, each label is generated from the logistic
distribution P(y = 1) = 1/
(
1 + exp(x>i θ
∗)
)
. In this problem, we vary the privacy budget  from 2 to
10, and set δ = 0.01. We present the estimation error versus privacy budget  of different methods
in Figure 2(c) and 2(d). The results show that our method can output accurate estimators when we
have relative large privacy budget, and it consistently outperforms the private baseline.
5.2 Real Data Experiments
For real data experiments, we use E2006-TFIDF dataset (Kogan et al., 2009) and RCV1 dataset
(Lewis et al., 2004), for the evaluation of sparse linear regression and sparse logistic regression,
respectively.
E2006-TFIDF data For sparse linear regression problem, we use E2006-TFIDF dataset, which
consists of financial risk data from thousands of U.S. companies. In detail, it contains 16087 training
examples, 3308 testing examples, and we randomly sample 25000 features for this experiment. In
order to validate our proposed framework, we randomly divide the original dataset into two datasets:
private dataset and public dataset. For the private dataset, it contains 8044 training examples, and
we assume that this dataset contains the sensitive information that we want to protect. For the
public dataset, it contains 8043 training examples. We set s = 2000, δ = 10−5,  ∈ [0.8, 5]. We
estimate β˜ by the sample covariance matrix. Table 2 reports the mean square error (MSE) on the
test data of different methods for various privacy budgets over 10 trails. The results show that the
performance of our algorithm is close to the non-private baseline even when we have small private
budgets, and is much better than existing methods.
RCV1 data For sparse logistic regression, we use a Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) data set for
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text categorization research. RCV1 is released by Reuters, Ltd. for research purposes, and consists
of over 800000 manually categorized newswire stories. It contains 20242 training examples, 677399
testing examples and 47236 features. As before, we randomly divide the original dataset into two
datasets with equal size serving as the private and publice datasets. In addition, we randomly choose
10000 test examples and 20000 features, and set s = 500, δ = 10−5,  ∈ [2, 8]. We estimate β˜ by the
sample covariance matrix. We compare all algorithms in terms of their classification error on the
test set over 10 replications, which is summarized in Table 3. Evidently our algorithm achieves the
lowest test error among all private algorithms on RCV1 dataset, which demonstrates the superiority
of our algorithm.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we developed a differentially private framework for sparse learning using the idea
of knowledge transfer. We establish the linear convergence rate and the utility guarantee of our
method. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world data demonstrate the superiority of our
algorithm. For the future work, it is very interesting to generalize our framework to other structural
constrained learning problems such as the low-rank estimation problem. It is also very interesting
to study the theoretical lower-bound of the differentially private sparse learning problem to access
the optimality of our proposed method.
A Additional Results
In this section, we present the additional theoretical guarantees of our methods under the extra
sparse eigenvalue conditions for sparse linear and logistic regression.
A.1 Additional Main Results
Corollary A.1. Suppose that each row xi of the design matrix satisfies xi ∼ N(0,Σ), maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤
K, and the noise vector ξ ∼ N(0, ν2In). For a given , δ, under the same conditions of Corollary
4.7 on D˜, σ2, λ, η1, η2, s, there exist constants {Ci}4i=1 such that if m = n ≥ C1s log d, the output of
Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP. In addition, with probability at least 1− C2/d, we have
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C3ν2K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C4α˜
2K2
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
β˜n22
.
Remark A.2. According to Corollary A.1, we can achieve an improved utility guarantee O˜
(
K2s∗3/(n)2
)
for sparse linear regression if we have further assumption, i.e., Gaussian distribution, on the private
data xi.
Corollary A.3. Suppose that each row xi of the design matrix satisfies xi ∼ N(0,Σ), maxi∈[n] ‖xi‖∞ ≤
K. For a given , δ, under the same conditions of Corollary 4.7 on D˜, σ2, λ, η1, η2, s, there exist
constants {Ci}4i=1 such that if m = n ≥ C1s log d, the output of Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP. In
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addition, with probability at least 1− C2/d, we have the following utility for θp
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ C3K2
s∗ log d
n
+ C4α˜
2K2s∗2
log d log(1/δ)
β˜n22
.
Remark A.4. Corollary A.3 shows that if we have further assumption, i.e., Gaussian distribution,
on the private data xi, we can obtain an improved utility guarantee O˜
(
K2s∗2/(n)2
)
for sparse
linear logistic regression.
B Proofs of the Main Results
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In this subsection, we will derive the differential privacy of Algorithm 1. First, we need the following
lemma to characterize the properties of the generated samples. It has been previously proved for
many common examples of sub-Gaussian random design Raskutti et al. (2011); Agarwal et al.
(2010); Rudelson and Zhou (2012).
Lemma B.1. Suppose each row of the design matrix X˜ ∈ Rm×d follows sub-Gaussian distribution
with parameter α˜, and the covariance matrix ‖Σ˜‖2 ≤ β˜, there exist some constants {Ci}2i=1 such
that for all v ∈ Rd with at most s nonzero entries, if m ≥ C1sα2 log d, with probability at least
1− exp(−C2m), we have
ψ1β˜‖v‖22 ≤
‖X˜v‖22
m
≤ ψ2β˜‖v‖22,
where ψ1 = 4/5 and ψ2 = 6/5.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Note that there is no privacy issue with respect to the newly generated
features x˜i ∈ Rd for i = 1, . . . ,m. We only need to prove that the generated predictions yp1 , . . . , ypm
satisfy differential privacy. Thus by the post-processing property, i.e., Lemma 2.7, we can show that
the output θp of Algorithm 1 satisfies differential privacy.
According to Algorithm 1, we generate the new training set Sp with i-th example as (ypi , x˜i),
where ypi = 〈θ̂, x˜i〉+ ξi, x˜i ∼ D˜, ξi ∼ N(0, σ2). Consider the following function q : Sn → Rm such
that the i-th coordinate of q(S) is 〈θ̂S , x˜i〉, where θ̂S is trained on the training set S using IGHT,
i.e., Algorithm 2. Thus for the function q, we can characterize its sensitivity as follows: for two
adjacent training sets S, S′ with one different example indexed by i, we have
∆(q) =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(〈θ̂S , x˜i〉 − 〈θ̂S′ , x˜i〉)2
=
√√√√ m∑
i=1
〈θ̂S − θ̂S′ , x˜i〉2
≤
√
2mβ˜
∥∥θ̂S − θ̂S′∥∥2, (B.1)
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where the last inequality is due to the Lemma B.1. Note that the inequality (B.1) holds with
probability at least 1− exp(−C2m). We will show in next that how this high probability can be
absorbed into the definition of (, δ)-DP. Let us define the event E: inequality (B.1) holds, and we
have P[E¯] ≤ δ2, where δ2 = exp(−C2m). As long as we have m ≥ C3 log(2/δ), we can get δ2 ≤ δ/2.
Given the event E holds, we can proceed to derive the privacy guarantee of our method as follows.
For two adjacent training sets S and S′, we define θminS and θ
min
S′ as follows
θminS = argmin
θ∈Rd
L¯S(θ) := LS(θ) +
λ
2
‖θ‖22 subject to ‖θ‖0 ≤ s,
θminS′ = argmin
θ∈Rd
L¯S′(θ) := LS′(θ) +
λ
2
‖θ‖22 subject to ‖θ‖0 ≤ s.
Therefore, we can obtain∥∥θ̂S − θ̂S′∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥θ̂S − θminS ∥∥2 + ∥∥θ̂S′ − θminS′ ∥∥2 + ∥∥θminS − θminS′ ∥∥2
≤ %T∥∥θminS ∥∥2 + %T∥∥θminS′ ∥∥2 + ∥∥θminS − θminS′ ∥∥2, (B.2)
where % < 1 and the last inequality is due to the convergence guarantee Yuan et al. (2014) of IGHT
for L¯S , L¯S′ . Since L¯S is strongly convex with parameter λ, we have
〈∇L¯S(θminS )−∇L¯S(θminS′ ),θminS − θminS′ 〉 ≥ λ
∥∥θminS − θminS′ ∥∥22.
In addition, we have 〈∇L¯S(θminS ),θminS′ − θminS 〉 ≥ 0, 〈∇L¯S′(θminS′ ),θminS − θminS′ 〉 ≥ 0, which implies
〈∇L¯S′(θminS′ )−∇L¯S(θminS′ ),θminS − θminS′ 〉 ≥ λ
∥∥θminS − θminS′ ∥∥22.
Thus we can obtain
λ
∥∥θminS − θminS′ ∥∥2 ≤ √2s∥∥∇L¯S′(θminS′ )−∇L¯S(θminS′ )∥∥∞
=
√
2s
2n
∥∥∇`(θminS′ ; xi)−∇`(θminS′ ; xi′)∥∥∞. (B.3)
Since we have ‖∇`(θminS′ ; xi)‖∞ ≤ γ for all xi, we can get
‖θminS − θminS′ ‖2 ≤
√
2sγ
nλ
. (B.4)
As a result, combining (B.1), (B.2), and (B.4), for large enough T , we can obtain
∆(q) ≤ 2
√
msβ˜
γ
nλ
. (B.5)
As a result, according to Lemma 2.6, to ensure (, δ/2)-DP, we need to add the zero mean Gaussian
vector with the variance parameter
σ2 =
8mβ˜sγ2
n22λ2
log(2.5/δ). (B.6)
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We use M to denote our mechanism, i.e., Algorithm 1. Given E happens, M satisfies (, δ/2)-DP.
Now, we are ready show that M satisfies (, δ)-DP. According to Remark 3.1.2 in Dwork et al.
(2006), we need to prove that
max
O∈R
log
P[M(S) ∈ O]− δ
P[M(S′) ∈ O] ≤ .
Since we have for all O ∈ R
P[M(S) ∈ O] = P[M(S) ∈ O | E] · P[E] + P[M(S) ∈ O | E¯] · P[E¯]
≤ (eP[M(S′) ∈ O | E] + δ/2) · P[E] + δ/2
≤ eP[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ/2 + δ/2,
where the second inequality is due to the (, δ/2)-DP of our method given inequality (B.1) holds,
and the fact that P[E¯] ≤ δ/2. Therefore, we can obtain that
max
O∈R
log
P[M(S) ∈ O]− δ
P[M(S′) ∈ O] ≤ maxO∈R log
eP[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ/2 + δ/2− δ
P[M(S′) ∈ O] = ,
which implies Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP. And the conditions we need are: x˜i are i.i.d. sub-
Gaussian random vector with parameter α, the generated sample sizem ≥ max{C1sα˜2 log d,C3 log(2/δ)},
where C1, C3 are absolute constants.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5
In this subsection, we establish the utility guarantee of Algorithm 1. In order to prove the utility
guarantee of our method, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma B.2. Consider the sparsity constrained problem (1.1). Suppose that L¯S is β¯-smooth, and
LS satisfies Condition 4.1 with parameter ε. There exist constants {Ci}5i=1 such that if η = C1λ/β¯2,
s ≥ C2κ2s∗, where κ = β¯/λ, the output θ̂ of Algorithm 2 satisfies the following with probability at
least 1− ρ
‖θT − θ∗‖22 ≤ %T ‖θ0 − θ∗‖22 + C4
s∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞),
where % = 1− 1/(7κ). If T is large enough, we have ‖θT − θ∗‖22 ≤ C5s∗(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞)/β¯2.
The next lemma, which has been proved in Loh and Wainwright (2013), provides the statistical
error of sparse linear regression, which will be used to characterize the statistical error of our newly
constructed learning problem.
Lemma B.3. For a Gaussian random vector  ∈ Rn with zero mean and variance ν2In, if each row
of X ∈ Rn×d are independent sub-Gaussian random vector with sub-Gaussian parameter α, we have
with probability at least 1− exp(−C6n)∥∥∥∥ 1nX>
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ C7να
√
log d
n
,
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where C6, C7 are absolute constants.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. According to Lemma B.2, we can obtain that
‖θ̂ − θ∗‖22 ≤ C1
s∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞), (B.7)
where C1 is a universal constant. According to Algorithm 1, we have
L˜(θ) =
1
2m
m∑
i=1
(
ypi − 〈θ, x˜i〉
)2
.
Note that according to Lemma B.1, L˜ satisfies Condition 4.2 with parameters ψ1β˜, ψ2β˜, where
ψ1 = 4/5, ψ2 = 6/5 . In addition, according to Lemma B.3, we have ‖∇L˜(θ̂)‖∞ = ‖X˜>ξ/n‖∞ = ε˜ ≤
C2σα˜
√
log d/m holds with probability at least 1− exp(−C3m). As a result, according to Lemma
B.2, we can get
‖θp − θ̂‖22 ≤ C4
s∗
β˜2
ε˜2, (B.8)
where C2, C3, C4 are universal constants. As a result, combining (B.7) and (B.8), we can obtain
‖θp − θ∗‖22 ≤ 2‖θ̂p − θ̂‖22 + 2‖θ̂ − θ∗‖22
≤ 2C1 s
∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞) + 2C2
s∗
β˜2
ε˜2
≤ C5 s
∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞) + C6α˜2
s∗
β˜2
· log d
m
σ2,
where C5, C6 are absolute constants. Plugging the definition of σ
2 in (B.6), we can get
‖θ̂p − θ∗‖22 ≤ C5
s∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞) + C7α˜2
β˜s˜∗2
β˜2
γ2 log d
n22λ2
log(2.5/δ).
Let λ2 = C8γ
√
s∗ log d log(1/δ)/(n), we can get
‖θ̂p − θ∗‖22 ≤ C9
s∗
β¯2
ε2 + C10
(
1
β¯2
+
α˜2
β˜
)
γ
√
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
n
,
where C7, C8, C9, C10 are absolute constants. Note that according to Lemma B.2, Algorithm 1 has
a linear convergence rate.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 4.7
In this subsection we show that if LS further satisfies Condition 4.2, our method can achieve an
improved utility guarantee.
Proof of Corollary 4.7. We first prove the privacy guarantee of our method. The proof is similar to
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the proof of Theorem 4.3. Since we have that L satisfies Condition 4.2 with parameters µ, β, we
can get the sensitivity of our method according to (B.5) as follows
∆(q) ≤ 2
√
msβ˜
γ
nµ
.
Therefore, according to (B.6), if we add the noise with the following variance
σ2 =
8mβ˜sγ2
n22µ2
log(2.5/δ),
we can ensure that Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP.
Next, we establish the utility guarantee of our method. According to (B.7), we have
‖θ̂ − θ∗‖22 ≤ C1
s∗
β2
ε2. (B.9)
In addition, according to (B.8), we have
‖θ̂p − θ̂‖22 ≤ C2α˜2
β˜s˜∗2
β˜2
γ2 log d
n22µ2
log(2.5/δ). (B.10)
Combining (B.9) and (B.10), we can get
‖θ̂p − θ∗‖22 ≤ C3
s∗
β2
ε2 + C4α˜
2 s
∗2γ2 log d
β˜n22µ2
log(2.5/δ),
where C1, C2, C3, C4 are absolute constants. This completes the proof.
C Proofs of Specific Examples
In this section, we only establish the utility guarantees of our proposed method for different
problems, including sparse linear regression and sparse logistic regression since the privacy guarantee
of Algorithm 1 has been proved in Theorem 4.3. For the ease of presentation, we use L to denote
LS in the following discussion.
C.1 Proof of Corollary 4.9
In order to prove Corollary 4.9, we only need to verify Condition 4.1 for L, the upper bound γ of `i.
Proof of Corollary 4.9. According to the objective function in (4.1), we have the following close
form of gradient and Hessian for L
∇L(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(x>i θ − yi)xi, ∇2L(θ) =
X>X
n
,
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where xi is the i-th row of the design matrix X. First, we verify that L¯ is β¯-smooth. According to the
proof of Lemma B.2, we only need to show the upper bound of ∇2L(θ) restricted to some 3s sparse
support Ω. As a result, we have
∥∥(∇2L(θ))
Ω,Ω
∥∥
2
≤ 3sK2, which implies that β¯ = 3sK2 + λ. In
addition, we have ∇L(θ∗) = X>ε/n. According to the proof of Corollary 2 in Loh and Wainwright
(2013), we have ‖∇L(θ∗)‖∞ ≤ C1νK
√
log d/n holds with probability at least 1 − exp(−C2n),
where C1, C2 are absolute constants. Thus we have Condition 4.1 holds for L. Next, we are going
to estimate the parameter γ for our utility guarantee. For the loss function on each training
example, we have `i(θ) = (〈xi,θ〉 − yi)2/2, which implies ∇`i(θ) = (〈xi,θ〉 − yi)xi. According to
(B.3), we need to verify ‖∇`i(θmin)‖∞ ≤ γ, where θmin is the minimizer of (1.1). Since we have
‖∇`i(θmin)‖∞ = ‖(〈xi,θmin〉 − yi)xi‖∞ ≤ C3
√
sK2, which implies that γ ≤ C3
√
sK2.
Finally, plugging these results into Theorem 4.5, we have if λ2 = C4K
2s∗
√
log d log(1/δ)/
(
n
)
,
we can get
‖θ̂p − θ∗‖22 ≤ C5ν2K2
s log d
n
+ C6α˜
2K
2s∗2
√
log d log(1/δ)
β˜n
.
C.2 Proof of Corollary 4.13
In this subsection, we prove the results for sparse logistic regression, and we only need to verify
Conditions 4.1 for L, the upper bound γ of `i.
Proof of Corollary 4.13. According to the loss function in (4.2), we can obtain
∇L(θ) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
yi − ψ(θ>xi)
)
xi, ∇2L(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ′(θ>xi)xix>i ,
where ψ(x) = exp(x)/(1 + exp(x)) and ψ′(x) = exp(x)/(1 + exp(x))2. Since we have ψ′(x) ≤ 1,
following the same proof procedure as before, we can get L¯ is β¯-smooth with β¯ = 3sK + λ. In
addition, we have ∇L(θ∗) = 1n
∑n
i=1 bixi, where bi = yi − ψ(θ∗>xi). Thus, according to the proof
of Corollary 2 in Loh and Wainwright (2013), we have ‖∇L(θ∗)‖∞ ≤ C1K
√
log d/n holds with
probability at least 1− C2/d, where C1, C2 are absolute constants. In addition, we have
‖∇`i(θmin)‖∞ =
∥∥(yi − ψ(θ>minxi))xi∥∥∞ ≤ K,
where the inequality is due the the fact that yi ∈ {0, 1}, ψ(x) ∈ (0, 1), and ‖xi‖∞ ≤ K. Thus we
have γ = K for sparse logistic regression.
Finally, plugging these results into Theorem 4.5, we have if λ2 = C6K
√
s∗ log d log(1/δ)/
(
n
)
,
we can get
‖θ̂p − θ∗‖22 ≤ C7ν2K2
s log d
n
+ C8α˜
2K
√
s∗3 log d log(1/δ)
β˜n
.
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C.3 Proof of Corollary A.1
To prove this result, we only need to verify that L satisfies the sparse eigenvalue condition since
other conditions has been previously verified in the proof of Corollary 4.9.
Proof of Corollary A.1. Since we have ∇2L(θ) = X>X/n, according to Proposition 1 in Agarwal
et al. (2010), we can obtain that L satisfies Condition 4.2 with parameters β = 6/5 and µ = 4/5 with
probability at least 1− exp(−C1n) if we have n ≥ C2s log d, where C1, C2 are absolute constants.
Therefore, following the same proof procedure as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, this high probability
can be absorbed into the δ term in the (, δ)-DP. As a results, we complete the proof.
C.4 Proof of Corollary A.3
To prove this result, we only need to verify that L satisfies the sparse eigenvalue condition since
other conditions has been previously verified in the proof of Corollary 4.13.
Proof of Corollary A.1. Since we have ∇2L(θ) = (n)−1∑ni=1 ψ′(θ>xi)xix>i , and ψ′(θ>xi is upper
and lower bounded by some constants C1, C2, we can follow the same procedure as in the proof of
Corollary A.1 to show that L satisfies Condition 4.2 with parameters β = 6/5C1 and µ = 4/5C2.
As a results, we complete the proof.
D Proofs of Additional Lemmas
In this section, we prove the additional lemmas used in the proofs of the main results. For the ease
of presentation, we use L to denote LS .
D.1 Proof of Lemma B.2
Proof. According to Algorithm 2, we have
θt+1 = Hs
(
θt − η∇L¯(θt)
)
.
We denote Ω = supp(θt) ∪ supp(θt+1) ∪ supp(θ∗), and we have s ≤ |Ω| ≤ (2s + s∗). In addition,
we denote θ˜t+1 by PΩ
(
θt − η∇L¯(θt)
)
, thus we have θt+1 = Hs(θ˜t+1). Furthermore, we have the
following
‖θ˜t+1 − θ∗‖22 =
∥∥PΩ(θt − η∇L¯(θt))− θ∗∥∥22
=
∥∥θt − θ∗ − ηPΩ(∇L¯(θt))∥∥22
=
∥∥∥θt − θ∗ − ηPΩ(∇L¯(θ∗) + (H(γ))∗Ω(θt − θ∗))∥∥∥22,
where the last equation is due to the fundamental theorem of calculus, H(γ) =
∫ 1
0 ∇2L¯(θ∗ + γ(θ −
θ∗))dγ, and H(γ)∗Ω denotes that we restrict columns of H(γ) to the support Ω. Therefore, according
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to the definition of PΩ, we can further obtain
‖θ˜t+1 − θ∗‖22 =
∥∥A(θt − θ∗)− ηPΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22
≤ ‖A‖22 · ‖θt − θ∗‖22 + η2
∥∥PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22 − 2η〈A(θt − θ∗),PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))〉,
where we have A = I− η(H(γ))
ΩΩ
. Thus by Young’s inequality, we can obtain
−2η〈A(θt − θ∗),PΩ
(∇L¯(θ∗))〉 ≤ 2ηβ¯
7
‖θt − θ∗‖22 +
14η
β¯
(‖A‖22 · ∥∥PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22).
Therefore, we can get
‖θ˜t+1 − θ∗‖22 ≤ ‖A‖22 · ‖θt − θ∗‖22 + η2
∥∥PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22 + 2ηβ¯7 ‖θt − θ∗‖22 + 14ηβ¯ (‖A‖22 · ∥∥PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22)
≤
(
1− 5ηβ¯
7
)
‖θt − θ∗‖22 +
(14η
β¯
− 14η2
)∥∥PΩ(∇L¯(θ∗))∥∥22,
where the last inequality is due to the Condition 4.2.
In addition, according to Lemma 3.3 in Li et al. (2016), we have
‖θt+1 − θ∗‖22 ≤
(
1 +
2
√
s∗√
s− s∗
)
‖θ˜t+1 − θ∗‖22, (D.1)
which implies that
‖θt+1 − θ∗‖22 ≤ α
(
1− 5ηβ¯
7
)
‖θt − θ∗‖22 + α(2s+ s∗)
[(14η
β¯
− 14η2
)(‖∇L¯(θ∗)‖2∞)],
where α = 1 + 2
√
s∗/
√
s− s∗. Since we have η = 2λ/β¯2, as long as s ≥ (4κ2 + 1)s∗, where κ = β¯/λ,
we can get
‖θt+1 − θ∗‖22 ≤ %‖θt − θ∗‖22 + C1
s∗λ
β¯3
‖∇L¯(θ∗)‖2∞,
where the we have % ≤ 1− 1/(7κ) < 1.
In addition, we have ∇L¯(θ∗) = ∇L(θ∗) + λθ∗. According to Condition 4.1, we have
‖∇L¯(θ∗)‖∞ = ‖∇L(θ∗) + λθ∗‖∞ ≤ ‖∇L(θ∗)‖∞ + λ‖θ∗‖∞ ≤ ε+ λ‖θ∗‖∞.
As long as we choose λ = O(ε/‖θ∗‖∞), we can get
‖θt+1 − θ∗‖22 ≤ %‖θt − θ∗‖22 + C2
s∗λ
β¯3
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞). (D.2)
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Thus taking sum of (D.2) over t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, we can get
‖θT − θ∗‖22 ≤ %T ‖θ∗‖22 + C2
s∗λ
β¯3(1− %)(ε
2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞)
≤ %T ‖θ∗‖22 + C2
s∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞). (D.3)
Therefore, if we have
T ≥ C3κ log β¯‖θ
∗ − θ0‖2
s∗(ε+ λ‖θ∗‖∞) ,
we can obtain that
‖θT − θ∗‖22 ≤ C4
s∗
β¯2
(ε2 + λ2‖θ∗‖2∞),
where {Ci}4i=1 are universal constants.
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